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ABSTRACT
The last 50 years have seen the progressive refinement of our understanding of the mechanisms of classical 
conditioning and this has resulted in the development of several influential theories that are able to explain 
with considerable precision a wide variety of experimental findings, and to make non-intuitive predictions 
that have been confirmed. This success has spurred the development of increasingly sophisticated models 
that encompass more complex phenomena. In such context, it is widely acknowledged that computational 
modeling plays a fundamental part. In this paper the authors analyze critically the role that computational 
models, as simulators and as psychological models by proxy, have played in this enterprise.
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INTRODUCTION
In natural environments organisms are com-
pelled to constantly accommodate their behavior 
to dynamic surroundings. Learning to predict 
event regularities in such sensory rich conditions 
is vital for adaptive behavior and decision-
making. Associative learning studies have 
mostly been conducted within the groundwork 
of classical conditioning –which is based on the 
principle that repeated pairings of two events 
will allow an individual to predict the occurrence 
of one of them upon presentation of the other, as 
consequence of the formation of an association 
between them (see Mackintosh, 1994; Wasser-
man & Miller, 1997; Pearce & Bouton, 2001). 
This simple mechanism is considered to underlie 
many learning phenomena and has proved to be 
relevant to human learning both theoretically 
(judgment of causality and categorization, e.g., 
(Shanks, 1995)) and practically, as the core of 
a large number of clinical models (Haselgrove 
& Hogarth, 2011; Schachtman & Reilly, 2011).
Hence, it is widely accepted that classical 
conditioning is at the basis of most learning 
phenomena and behavior and thus paramount 
that we develop accurate models of condition-
ing. In this endeavor, collaboration between 
psychologists and computer scientists has en-
joyed considerable success (Schmajuk, 2010a; 
Schmajuk, 2010b; Alonso & Mondragón, 2011). 
This collaboration is sustained on well-known 
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arguments: Expressing models as sets of algo-
rithms grants us formal ways of representing 
psychological intuitions and means of calculat-
ing their predictions accurately and quickly; 
from computational models we also borrow a 
view, the so-called computer metaphor, on how 
information is processed that has proved use-
ful in understanding cognition; moreover, the 
architectures in which computational models 
are implemented, artificial neural networks for 
instance, resemble those of associative learning, 
both at conceptual and neural levels; finally, 
machine learning models, such as temporal 
difference learning and Bayesian learning, can 
be viewed as effective abstractions of how as-
sociations are formed and processed.
In this paper we analyze critically the 
assumptions upon which such arguments are 
built. We identify two main trends in so-called 
computational psychology, more in particular in 
the use of computational models in the study of 
conditioning, namely, as psychological models 
by proxy and as simulators.
COMPUTATIONAL MODELS 
AS MODELS OF LEARNING
Computational models of learning have been 
considered as psychological models in them-
selves. This position, that constitutes a milestone 
in the annals of cognitive science and artificial 
intelligence, is in fact a misuse of the term. We 
are illustrating our contention by means of a 
paradigmatic example, the use of Artificial Neu-
ral Networks (ANNs) in conditioning theory. 
In what follows we discuss the inadequacy of 
such approach at different levels of analysis, 
namely, ontological, formal, representational, 
functional, and structural.
The Ontological Level
ANNs are considered the substratum of con-
ditioning. The motivational rationale is that 
(a) ANNs model by analogy natural neural 
networks and that (b) psychological processes, 
including conditioning, are ultimately embed-
ded in natural neural networks; consequently, 
ANNs stand as a model of conditioning.
Despite the appeal in this line of argumen-
tation, it is widely acknowledged that ANNs 
do not resemble natural neural networks in 
any fundamental way (Enquist & Ghirlanda, 
2005); moreover, there is no strong evidence 
suggesting that neural activity and associative 
learning are indeed related (Morris, 1994) –or 
for that matter, that psychological processes can 
be uniquely localized in specific brain regions as 
recently shown in Vul, Harris, Winkielman, and 
Pashler (2009), and advanced in Uttal (2001).
Even if it did, a neural analysis would not 
necessarily shed light to the study of learning 
phenomena. In the words of B. F. Skinner “The 
analysis of behavior need not wait until brain 
science has done its part. The behavioral facts 
will not be changed (…). Brain science may 
discover other kinds of variables affecting be-
havior, but it will turn to a behavioral analysis 
for the clearest account of their effects” (Skin-
ner, 1989, pp. 18). It should be noted that such 
a radical statement does not contradict a version 
of reductionism that most neuroscientists and 
cognitive psychologists would endorse, namely, 
Richard Dawkin’s hierarchical reductionism 
(Dawkins, 1986), according to which one should 
determine the proper low explanatory level for 
the system under study.
The Formal Level
Some formalizations of ANNs and condition-
ing incorporate analogous formal descriptions. 
Nonetheless, that a version of Dirac’s rule 
can be taken as a formal description of both 
neural plasticity and long-term potentiation 
effects –the Hebbian rule (Hebb, 1949)– and 
of association formation –as characterized by 
the Rescorla-Wagner rule (Rescorla & Wagner, 
1972)– cannot be considered as proof of any 
common underlying structure and should not 
be used as an argument to reduce psychological 
phenomena to their alleged neural substratum.
Similarly, that the Rescorla-Wagner rule 
is essentially identical to the Widrow-Hoff rule 
(Widrow & Hoff, 1960) for training Adeline 
units and that, in turn, such rule can be seen 
as a primitive form of the generalized delta 
rule for backpropagation only tells us that, 
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computationally speaking, associative learn-
ing follows an error-correction algorithm1. A 
computational model does not identify however 
the underlying psychological factors (attention, 
motivation, etc.) involved in classical condi-
tioning or how the physical characteristics of 
the elements (e.g., the salience of the stimuli) 
affect such processes.
Clearly, sharing a common formal expres-
sion does not necessarily imply that the phe-
nomena so expressed are of the same nature: 
Power functions, for example, can be used to 
express the relationship between (1) the orbital 
period of a planet and its orbital semi-major axis 
(Kepler’s third law), (2) the metabolic rate of 
a species and their body mass (Kleiber’s law), 
and (3) the magnitude of a stimulus and its 
perceived intensity (Stevens’ law). To quote 
Richard Shull “The fact that an equation of a 
particular form describes a set of data does not 
mean that the assumptions that gave rise to the 
equation are supported. The same equation can 
be derived from very different sets of assump-
tions” (Shull, 1991, pp. 246).
In other words, we cannot assume that the 
meaning of a formal model is in the linguistic 
expression it takes (or that there is a unique 
isomorphism between phenomenon and al-
gorithm). If we did, we would not be able to 
explain how a theory can be expressed in differ-
ent sets of equations. Likewise, we would have 
no guarantees of the effect that the addition or 
the removal of a simple parameter may have. 
Paraphrasing (Chakravartty, 2001), theories and 
models can be given linguistic formulations but 
theories and models should not be identified 
with such formulations2.
The Representational Level
ANNs are connectionist models that do not 
store information explicitly in symbols and 
rules but rather in the weights (strengths) of 
the connections. Following this interpretation, 
learning consists of changes in these weights. 
It is claimed, rightly, that this assumption 
underlies associative learning models and 
hence, wrongly, that ANNs are the substrate 
of associative learning phenomena. This quite 
straightforward argument is, in fact, a fallacy: 
As connectionists (at least implementational 
connectionists) themselves concede the way 
we represent learning in the network, either as 
continuous changes of weighted connections or 
as the result of discrete symbolic processing, is 
a matter of convenience and therefore irrelevant 
to the study of the structures involved.
This debate has been core in differentiating 
between “associative models” and “computa-
tional models” of learning: It is understood 
that associative models are historically and 
conceptually linked to connectionism (Medler, 
1998) whereas computational approaches are 
inspired in the theory of information processing 
(Gallistel & Gibbon, 2001). Traditionally, the 
former approach is considered as sub-symbolic, 
therefore not formal, and the latter as symbolic, 
that is, computable by a Turing Machine. It can 
be argued however, following Peter R. Killeen, 
that both approaches are indeed formal (Killeen, 
2001): Turing machines and ANNs are both 
computational models3; in particular, Turing 
Machines and ANNs are equivalent in their 
input/output behavior, that is, they compute the 
same problems and accept the same languages 
(Chomsky, 1956)4.
The Functional Level
ANNs typically approximate solutions by 
iteratively minimizing an error function. A 
process that can be understood as a form of 
learning and that resembles learning by “trial 
and error”, an instance of associative learning. 
However, it is worth emphasizing that ANNs 
merely implement numerical methods. They 
are, in fact, statistical tools –with a misleading 
name, and certainly not the simplest, fastest or 
most efficient techniques (see, e.g., Mitchie, 
Spiegelhalter, & Taylor, 1994). On the other 
hand, associative learning models such as Re-
scorla and Wagner’s express dynamic laws: 
Against public opinion, animals do not make 
predictions and iteratively update an associative 
value through error minimization towards an 
optimal one. The associative value at a given 
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time is the right associative value –that ac-
curately describes the amount of learning at a 
given trial. Let’s put it another way: In standard 
conditions, learning about the full extent of the 
association after one single pairing would be 
non-adaptive –except in situations in which 
there is preparedness bias for quick learning 
(Seligman, 1971). That the system described 
by Rescorla and Wagner’s rule is limited by 
an asymptote (determined by the maximum 
reinforcing value of the US) does not confer 
any special status to such value –rather it just 
defines a constraint of the system.
The Structural Level
The layout of an ANN, the way units are con-
nected within and between layers, can be in-
terpreted as a cognitive architecture. Let’s take 
a computational example to counter-argue this 
point: Network communications are designed 
and built following the Open Systems Intercon-
nection model (OSI) (Zimmerman, 1980), from 
the physical layer that describes the electrical 
specifications of the devices the networks con-
sist of up to the application layer that describes 
how the user interacts with a given piece of 
software. Thus, the OSI model implements a 
hierarchical and integrated architecture, that is, 
the type of cognitive architecture that a compu-
tational model of associative learning should 
allegedly support (Sun, 2008). Why don’t we 
use the OSI model as a psychological model 
then? At the end of the day, structurally, OSI 
would make as good a psychological model as 
an ANN. That ANNs are networks implemented 
in architectures that take advantage of massive 
computational parallelism – not surprisingly, the 
new connectionism landmark paper introduced 
the Parallel Distributed Processing paradigm in 
cognition (Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986), 
does not confer them any psychological advan-
tage: Any complex network would do (Newman, 
Barabási, & Watts, 2006).
TEMPORAL DIFFERENCE 
AS AN EXAMPLE
We are now narrowing down our analysis to 
a specific model of classical conditioning. 
Temporal Difference (TD) (Sutton & Barto, 
1987; 1990) is an error-correction model of 
associative learning that has become popular 
due to the fact that it allegedly explains clas-
sical conditioning at the three Marr’s levels: 
algorithmic, computational and physical. We are 
analyzing TD at each of these levels and arguing 
that regardless of which one is taken to model 
classical conditioning, TD does not succeed.
Algorithmic Level
From an algorithmic perspective, TD is a just a 
real-time extension of Rescorla and Wagner’s 
model. As a consequence, TD inherits Rescorla 
and Wagner’s limitations in predicting critical 
phenomena such as latent inhibition or spon-
taneous recovery. Current research trends in 
associative learning on the effects of attentional 
factors and on hierarchical structures are be-
yond the scope of this model. Even in dealing 
with temporal properties of conditioning, TD 
is severely restricted: First, the original TD 
model, in which stimuli are represented as 
single units regardless of their lengths, does 
not account for simple temporal discrimination. 
Its successor, CSC TD for Complete Serial 
Compounds TD, conceptualizes stimuli as a 
set of unique components (Moore, Choi, & 
Brunzell, 1998). In so doing, CSC TD faces the 
opposite problem that its predecessor, making 
it unable to predict temporal generalization. In 
addition, CSC TD is based on psychologically 
unrealistic assumptions such as the existence of 
a perfect clock. Recent attempts to solve these 
issues (microstimuli, (Ludvig, Sutton, & Kehoe, 
2012)) are not exempt of problems. In summary, 
algorithmically TD is ill-equipped to predict 
phenomena it was explicitly designed for.
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Computational Level
Computationally speaking, TD is not an accurate 
model of associative learning. Firstly, TD is 
based on the idea of optimization of a reward 
signal –animals are assumed to maximize 
reinforcement. Whereas this can be useful in 
control theory5, it is by no means a universally 
accepted principle in studies of animal behavior 
and, in fact, contradicts empirical evidence 
(Staddon, 2007). Secondly, even if it were, TD 
does not converge to optimality in the general 
case (Fairbank & Alonso, 2012), and diverges 
in most biologically relevant problems (Ludvig, 
Bellemare, & Pearson, 2011).
Physical Level
TD’s main appeal comes from describing 
associative learning at both behavioral and 
neural levels. Certainly, there seems to be a 
close correspondence between the behaviour 
of dopamine neurons in classical conditioning 
tasks and the prediction error in the TD algo-
rithm (e.g., Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997). 
How these studies advance our understanding 
of psychological processes is a different matter. 
At the end of the day, associative learning deals 
with psychological processes and psychological 
processes need to be explained at the psycho-
logical level. Other levels are not necessary or 
sufficient. The problem is that, in following 
Marr’s analysis, TD considers the neural as 
the physical level and implicitly neglects the 
psychological level as an abstraction that is 
only useful in so much as it ultimately relates 
to “what really happens”. This same reduction-
ist régime could also be applied to the neural 
level displacing “what really happens” towards 
a molecular level, and thus regarding neuron 
behavior as a byproduct of the latter. Our posi-
tion is that the physical level is the behavior of 
organisms, not neuronal spiking or blood flow.
Indeed, the confusion generated by using 
Marr’s hypothesis in the analysis of classical 
conditioning has spurred extreme positions 
that consider purely psychological models as 
superfluous –in the words of C.R. Gallistel and 
Louis D. Matzel “(…) antirepresentational form 
of associative theorizing may need to be aban-
doned.” (Gallistel & Matzel, 2013, pp. 174).
It is also argued that TD is a more com-
prehensive model of associative learning (than 
Rescorla and Wagner’s for instance) in that it 
explains both classical conditioning and in-
strumental conditioning (that TD practitioners 
renamed as Reinforcement Learning, RL). TD 
advocates seem to forget that, psychologically 
speaking, the associative structures of classi-
cal and instrumental conditioning are the same 
(Hall, 2002). In both procedures, changes in 
behavior are considered the result of an as-
sociation between two concurrent events and 
explained in terms of operations of a system 
that consists of nodes among which links can 
be formed. Moreover, a close inspection of 
the associations that RL explains reveals that 
it only covers one type of associations, argu-
ably considered as an instance of instrumental 
learning: RL focuses its analysis on S-R as-
sociations, those originally described in early 
learning theory by Thorndike’s law of effect to 
account for the formation of habits (Thorndike, 
1898). RL does not operate in principle with 
other associations in instrumental conditioning 
such as R-O or S-R-O associations, without 
which goal-directed behavior cannot be ad-
dressed. This is an inherent flaw of RL, since 
the reinforcer is not considered as an element 
of the association but rather as a signal that 
in some way “stamps on the S-R association” 
(Alonso & Mondragón, 2013).
Alternative computational models based 
on Bayesian inference and so-called “rational” 
approaches have been proposed in the area 
with limited success. These theories introduce 
concepts and techniques alien to psychological 
theory – are not “penetrable” (Wills & Pothos, 
2012) –, and fail dramatically when tested 
against classical conditioning phenomena (e.g., 
Gershman & Niv, 2012). Hence, it is difficult 
to evaluate how they can contribute to research 
in the field.
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COMPUTATIONAL MODELS 
AS SIMULATORS OF 
MODEL OF LEARNING
A different way of analyzing computational 
modeling in classical conditioning predicates 
that computational models can be considered 
as implementations of psychological models –
rather than as psychological models themselves. 
In this sense, a computational model is a tool to 
generate simulations that serve two main pur-
poses: On the one hand, implementing a model 
requires precise definitions, in the manner of 
a formal model or specific programming lan-
guage instructions, which make the pre-existing 
psychological model “accountable”. On the 
other hand, algorithms empower us to execute 
calculations rapidly and, most importantly, ac-
curately. Automation is paramount, particularly 
when the models involve non-linear equations 
that can only be solved numerically as it is the 
case of recent models of conditioning (Balkenius 
& Morén, 1998; Vogel, Castro, & Saavedra, 
2004; Mitchell & Le Pelley, 2010; Schmajuk 
& Alonso, 2012). Crucially, the outputs of a 
simulation feedback the psychological models 
–thus becoming cardinal in the cycle of theory 
formation and refinement.
Nonetheless, the advantages derived from 
using implementations do not spring solely from 
the formal specification of the psychological 
models in equations and algorithms. Per se, 
such descriptions constitute a mathematical 
model, a necessary yet no sufficient condition 
for a formal model to be computational. The 
essence of a computational model lies in the 
fact that it is implemented. From this view, in 
psychology, as well as in other empirical sci-
ences, a computational model is a model that 
has been simulated. In linguistic terms, we 
need to add semantic and pragmatic content 
to the syntactic description of the model for it 
to become computational.
This interpretation is not without critics: It 
has been argued that a model is computational if 
it is “implementable” –regardless of whether it is 
in fact described as a full-bodied computational 
model. This point of view can be considered as 
an abuse of the term “computational” since any 
psychological model of conditioning would fit 
this definition. Stretching the analogy, this use of 
the term “computational” would make all mod-
els of physics since Galileo’s computational.
From a theoretical point of view a compu-
tational model might be interpreted as a mere 
formalization of the concept of computation, 
which in turn does not necessarily require its 
implementation in a computer. Mathematically, 
the notion of computation is a mechanical or 
automated procedure, an algorithm (Turing, 
1937). Computers are physical instantiations of 
the abstract machines that would compute such 
procedures. In fact, this definition was proposed 
well before the first digital general-purpose 
computers had even been designed. Contrarily, 
our standpoint is that a computational model 
needs to be implemented in a computer if it is to 
add further to what constitutes a mathematical 
model in its own right.
An alternative source of disagreement 
about the use of the term computational can 
potentially be traced to cognitive science. As 
introduced in our discussion of TD above, 
the term “computational” has been linked to 
David Marr’s Tri-Level Hypothesis on vision. 
In Marr’s theory the “what” level translates as 
the computational level, the “how” refers to 
the algorithmic level and the “where” to the 
implementational level (Marr, 1982). However 
insightful such analysis may be, clearly what 
Marr denoted as “computational” refers to the 
psychological process itself –when applied to 
cognition. Insisting on talking about psycho-
logical models as if they were computational 
based on such taxonomy is, in our opinion, a 
source of misunderstanding.
MODEL SELECTION
Debating the characteristics of a good compu-
tational model of psychology influences the 
selection of models and in turn may help us de-
termine what a computational model “truly” is.
The selection of a model, psychological 
or otherwise, described in natural language or 
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mathematically, is not an easy task. It relies in 
formal definitions and methods as well as on 
scientific practice and common sense (Kuhn, 
1962; Feyerabend, 1975). Although quantitative 
formulas have been developed to compare mod-
els, based on the average size of the deviations 
from predicted values, the number of data points 
and free parameters (Akaike, 1974; Schwarz, 
1978), relying exclusively on such formalisms 
or applying blindly Occam’s razor is not advis-
able. According to Baum (1983) evaluating a 
model requires good judgment based on careful 
consideration of many factors, both technical 
and logical. The very essence of a model re-
flects the choices scientists make –what they 
consider relevant beyond the mere quantitative. 
It is thus critical that the community reaches 
an agreement on how to evaluate and compare 
their models. Unfortunately, it is often the case 
that researchers in a given area focus on small 
datasets that don’t cross domains. This conveys 
a lack of consensus on critical phenomena, 
on whether the number of parameters should 
be “penalized” or on whether the parameters 
should be fixed or optimized for each condition 
(Alonso & Schmajuk, 2012).
Consequently, we are compelled to ques-
tion what to assess when evaluating a compu-
tational model of learning.
If computational models are simulators 
then we would need to select amongst them 
according to their computational complexity, 
which is related to but not reducible to the al-
gorithms they implement. In other words, time 
and space (memory) of computation becomes 
paramount in the decision. In addition, these 
computing tools must be tested for reliability and 
dependability against failures –which, in turn, 
depend on various factors such as programming 
languages, operating systems, memory capac-
ity, processing speed, as well as on software 
engineering and management requirements. 
Computational models as simulators add a new 
level of sophistication. But this sophistication 
comes at a price: A computer program is not 
as “aseptic” as a mathematical description. A 
computer program takes life in algorithms and 
data structures that must comply with software 
and hardware specifications.
Regrettably, the state of the art in simu-
lation of classical conditioning is not very 
encouraging: Although classical conditioning 
software has been recently described in the 
literature (Schultheis, Thorwart, & Lachnit, 
2008a; Schultheis, Thorwart, & Lachnit, 2008b; 
Thorwart, Schulthei, König, & Lachnit, 2009; 
Alonso, Mondragón, & Fernández, 2012; 
Mondragón, Alonso, Fernández, & Gray, 2013; 
Mondragón, Gray, & Alonso, 2013), it is still 
the case that most psychologists in the area 
view simulations as mere addenda rather than 
as an integral part of experimental methodology. 
Simulation software is developed, implemented 
and documented in an ad hoc manner, raising 
serious concerns about its reliability, usability 
and scalability. As such, their impact is very 
limited –which conflicts with the widely ac-
cepted opinion that simulations are decisive in 
the development of accurate models of classical 
conditioning.
On the other hand, if computational models 
are considered as a valid alternative to psycho-
logical models, which criteria should be used to 
evaluate them and choose amongst them? There 
is no a clear answer to this question.
PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES
A final more general reason to explain the 
appeal of computational models in psychol-
ogy rests on the idea of isomorphism between 
computers and the brain, rebranding them as 
information processing systems, instantiations 
of a universal Turing machine or any other 
model of computation. But this idea alone does 
not justify the vast support that the “computer 
metaphor” enjoys. After all, any phenomena 
can potentially be expressed in terms of some 
sort of computation. The reason why this is 
such a powerful metaphor lies of the fact that 
this line of rationalization it is deeply rooted 
in Western philosophy and the mechanization 
of (formal) reasoning, reformulated in the 
twentieth century in terms of computation. That 
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computation has been effectively embedded in 
computers has reinforced the idea that the same 
must be true is in the brain, that the study of the 
former will help understand the latter and, in a 
tour the force, that computers may be capable 
of displaying intelligence. Indeed, every scien-
tific theory is shaped in the context of its age’s 
achievements and prejudices: Like Newton’s 
laws of mechanics strengthened the view of 
the Universe as a deterministic machine that 
worked as the sophisticated clocks so popular 
at the time, our conception of the mind as an 
information processing machine à la Turing has 
certainly been influenced by the development 
of computing technology.
And precisely because of its generality the 
information processing model is of little use: 
Working physicists do not model electrons, 
atoms or galaxies as information processing 
entities –be it in the form of a cellular automaton 
as envisaged in Zuse (1969) or as a participatory 
universe (Wheeler, 1990); on the other hand, 
neither (computational) physicists nor the public 
would presume that the simulation of a nuclear 
reaction generates real energy or that a flight 
simulator really flies. Of course, this does not 
preclude physicists from theorizing about what 
type of information is contained in a physical 
system (see, for example, literature on quantum 
entanglement or black holes) or about exploring 
the physical limits of computers (pioneered by 
Richard Feynman (Hey & Allen, 2000), and fol-
lowed up to contemporary theories of quantum 
computing e.g., Vedral, 2006). But these debates 
are not part of mainstream physics.
CONCLUSION
To sum it up, although the need to get influx 
from “outsiders” is recognized within the 
psychology community computational models 
should be taken with caution (see Townsend, 
2008). Computational models may provide 
us with complementary idealized models of 
psychological phenomena; they can also offer 
powerful statistical tools upon which psycholo-
gists can build data models; but computational 
models alone are not the appropriate methods 
to answer psychological questions. This is 
an obvious, hardly original, conclusion –and 
yet more often than not we read flamboyant 
news about robots that learn, think and experi-
ence emotions or ANNs that can do anything 
psychological models do only better. On the 
other hand, given the increasing complexity of 
psychological models of conditioning develop-
ing accurate and rapid simulators to test their 
predictions is, in our opinion, a must.
We would like to conclude with two warn-
ings against extreme cases in the misuse of 
computational models as psychological models. 
The first goes like this: We take psychological 
data and write a program that fits it. Since 
the data is psychological the program must 
constitute a psychological model. It should be 
obvious, however, that curve fitting does not 
automatically make a model “psychological” 
(or “biological” or “physical”). It must provide 
psychological insight. The second one is a 
cautionary note against hype: As an illustration, 
simple programs that, to some extent, learn to 
maximize a numerical signal by trial and error 
have been presented as a “theory of mind” (Sut-
ton, 2003). The history of Artificial Intelligence 
should have taught us better.
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ENDNOTES
1  Incidentally, backpropagation is merely a 
mathematical procedure to deriving partial 
derivatives –originally proposed to model so-
cial interactions not neural networks (Werbos, 
1974).
2  The ontological properties of mathematic 
constructs have been historically considered 
by scientists and philosophers alike (Dirac, 
1938). However, to the best of our knowledge 
that scientific propositions must be expressed 
mathematically does not confer them a special 
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relation with the phenomena under study. In 
other words, Descartes’ ontological argument 
does not seem to be an appropriate scientific 
method.
3  It should be noted that the first mathematical 
models of (A)NNs, McCulloch and Pitts’s 
(McCulloch & Pitts, 1943) and Turing’s B-
type machines (Turing, 1948) were intended 
to formalize logically, i.e., symbolically, the 
notion of learning.
4  Provided that the values of the weights are 
restricted to rational numbers (Orponen, 
1994).
5  TD was originally developed in control theory 
by Paul Werbos (Werbos, 1977), and coined 
as Heuristic Dynamic Programming.
